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INTRODUCTION
The manner in which financial firms are governed directly impacts the
stability and sustainability of both the financial sector and the "real" economy, as
the financial crisis and associated regulatory reform efforts have tragically
demonstrated.1 However, two fundamental tensions continue to complicate efforts
to reform corporate governance in post-crisis financial firms. The first relates to
reliance on increased equity capital as a buffer against shocks and a means of
limiting leverage. The tension here arises from the fact that no corporate
* Stembler Family Distinguished Professor in Business Law, University of
Georgia School of Law. For helpful comments and suggestions I am grateful to Lucian
Bebchuk, Erik Gerding, Jeremy Kress, Usha Rodrigues, and workshop participants at the
Law, Finance & Sustainability Conference (2017) hosted by the University of Sheffield's
Institute of Corporate and Commercial Law and co-sponsored by the University of Oslo's
Sustainable Market Actors for Responsible Trade (SMART) initiative, the International
Corporate Governance and Law Forum (2018) hosted by the University of Leeds' Centre for
Business Law and Practice and co-sponsored by the Deakin Law School and the Alexander
von Humboldt Foundation, and the National Business Law Scholars Conference (2018)
hosted by the University of Georgia School of Law.
1. See generally Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a
Time of Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 309 (2011).
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constituency desires risk more than equity does, and that risk preference only tends
to be stronger in banks and in situations involving financial distress-which places
a premium on evaluating who these capital providers are, and what their risk
incentives look like.2 The second tension relates to reliance on increased board
independence as a buffer between the risk-management function and senior
corporate management. The tension here arises from the fact that a growing
empirical literature increasingly associates board independence with increased risk-
taking and worse performance in the wake of the crisis, in addition to the more
general concern that independent directors may lack industry-relevant expertise.
This once again places a premium on evaluating who these outside voices in the
boardroom are, and what capacities they bring to the table in the financial context.'
This Essay explores these tensions in the context of financial firm governance and
assesses the intellectual groundwork that remains to be done as a preliminary to
identifying a coherent way forward.'
The appropriate role of shareholders in corporate governance and the ideal
composition of the board of directors represent two of the most fundamental-and
hotly contested-issues in corporate governance generally.5 However, several
unique features of banking render these issues even more fraught and complex in
the financial sector. Banks perform quasi-public functions relating to the creation
and distribution of money6 and occupy positions of heightened systemic significance
to the broader economy'-for which reason such institutions are widely said to
involve a broader range of core stakeholders than typical corporations do.8 At the
2. See infra Part I.
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Conclusions.
5. For an investigation of corporate governance in common-law countries-
emphasizing the cultural, social, and political contingency of these matters-see generally
CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD: THE
POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER POWER (2013).
6. See generally Morgan Ricks, Money as Infrastructure (Vanderbilt Law
Research Paper No. 17-63, 2018),
https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=3070270. See also Robert Hockett, Are
Bank Fiduciaries Special?, 68 ALA. L. REv. 1071, 1110-13 (2017); Saule T. Omarova, Bank
Governance and Systemic Stability: The "Golden Share " Approach, 68 ALA. L. REv. 1029,
1035-36, 1041-42 (2017); Yesha Yadav, Too-Big-to-Fail Shareholders,
MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 12-14),
https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2922681.
7. See Jeremy C. Kress, Board to Death: How Busy Directors Could Cause the
Next Financial Crisis, 59 B.C. L. REv. 878,886-88 (2018); Rend M. Stulz, Riskhxianagement,
Governance, Culture, and Risk Taking in Banks, FRBNY ECON. POL'Y REv., Aug. 2016, at
43, 47; Catarina Femandes et al., Bank Governance and Performance: A Survey of the
Literature, J. BANKING REG. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 3, 9),
https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2949798; Guido Ferrarini,
Understanding the Role of Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions: A Research
Agenda 4 (European Corporate Governance Institute Law Working Paper No. 347/2017, Mar.
2017), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2925721.
8. See generally Christopher M. Bruner, Conceptions of Corporate Purpose in
Post-Crisis Financial Firms, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 527 (2013); see also Fernandes et al.,
supra note 7, (manuscript at 3, 9- 10); Omarova, supra note 6, at 1036-3 7.
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same time, banking and finance involve forms and degrees of risk that differ
fundamentally from other sectors. Banks' central function of maturity
transformation-using short-term deposits to finance long-term lending-creates a
mismatch that raises the specter of destabilizing runs, 9 yet at the same time their
reliance on leverage naturally leads their shareholders to prefer greater risk-taking. 0
Deposit insurance, coupled with the perception that certain financial institutions
may be "too big to fail," may substantially allay the former concern, yet only at the
cost of exacerbating the latter.11 In addition to such dynamics, financial firm
governance is rendered even more challenging by the complexity and opacity of
financial assets, which are inherently difficult to assess and monitor12-particularly
as financial firms and their service offerings grow more sprawling.13
Such idiosyncrasies "impose unique demands on a financial institution's
board of directors to establish effective risk monitoring systems within the finn"14
and have prompted concerted regulatory efforts to contain and manage risk-taking
in banking and finance,15 yet the challenges remain daunting-not least due to the
staggering size and systemic significance of the largest financial firms today.
Despite efforts to counteract the "too big to fail" phenomenon, 16 the predominant
bank holding companies remain so large and so complex that the legislative claim
to have statutorily foreclosed future bailouts lacks credibility.17 As of December
9. See Ferrarini, supra note 7, at 5; Jonathan Macey & Maureen O'Hara, Bank
Corporate Governance: A Proposal for the Post-Crisis World, FRBNY ECON. POL'Y REV.,
Aug. 2016, at 85, 87; Omarova, supra note 6, at 1036; Yadav, supra note 6, (manuscript at
17-18).
10. See Fernandes et al., supra note 7, (manuscript at 13); Ferrarini, supra note 7,
at 4-5, 13-14; Stulz, supra note 7, at 44.
11. See Fernandes et al., supra note 7, (manuscript at 6, 15); Ferrarini, supra note
7, at 5-6; Macey & O'Hara, supra note 9, at 87-90.
12. See Fernandes et al., supra note 7, (manuscript at 12); Ferrarini, supra note 7,
at 5; Kress, supra note 7, at 886-87; Macey & O'Hara, supra note 9, at 88-90; Yadav, supra
note 6, (manuscript at 42-43); Colleen Baker et al., The Impacts of Financial Regulations:
Solvency and Liquidity in the Post-Crisis Period 6-7 (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
Working Paper No. 17-10, Apr. 18, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2958121.
13. See Yadav, supra note 6, (manuscript at 14-15); see also Macey & O'Hara,
supra note 9, at 92-98 (describing governance dynamics in bank holding companies);
Ferrarini, supra note 7, at 5-6 (describing risk dynamics in insurance companies); Baker et
al., supra note 12, at 7 (describing risk dynamics in nonbank financial firms).
14. Kress, supra note 7, at 888-89.
15. See Fernandes et al., supra note 7, (manuscript at 13-14); Stulz, supra note 7,
at 47.
16. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, § 214, 124 Stat. 1376, 1518 (2010).
17. See generally Stephen J. Lubben & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big and
Unable to Fail, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1205 (2017); see also RANA FOROOHAR, MAKERS AND
TAKERS: THE RISE OF FINANCE AND THE FALL OF AMERICAN BUSINESS 35-36 (2016); Sanjai
Bhagat, Financial Crisis, Corporate Governance, and Bank Capital 2 (June 15, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2987340; Jeremy Kress et al.,
Regulating Entities and Activities: Complementary Approaches to Nonbank System Risk, S.
CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 12-13),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=3238059.
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2017, the largest U.S. bank holding company, JPMorgan Chase, held total assets
exceeding $2.5 trillion, while the top five together held over $9.5 trillion.18 To bring
these figures into perspective, U.S. gross domestic product in 2017 amounted to
around $19.4 trillion,19 and total U.S. national wealth in 2010 amounted to around
$55.3 trillion.2
Given their persistent magnitude, their systemic significance, and the
potential threats posed to financial and economic stability 2 1 one might have
expected post-crisis regulatory reform efforts to have focused intently on how these
entities are governed. After all, the crisis and its aftermath powerfully brought home
that "the ultimate bearer of full residual risk of the bank's failure is the federal
govermnent, rather than private shareholders shielded by limited liability,"22 and
that "bank directors should be held to higher standards than the amateur standard
that governs directors generally. ' 23 Yet for all the energy and resources devoted to
post-crisis reforms-and despite a growing post-crisis empirical literature
associating shareholder-centric governance structures (including reliance on
independent directors) with excessive risk-taking and bad outcomes in the crisis24 -
18. The top five U.S. bank holding companies as of December 2017 were
JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Citigroup, and Goldman Sachs. See
Holding Companies with Assets Greater Than $10 Billion, NAT'L INFO. CTR.,
https://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/HCSGreaterThanlOB.aspx (last visited Sept. 14,
2018) (providing data for the quarter ending Dec. 31, 2017).
19. Gross Domestic Product 2017, WORLD BANK,
https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2018).
20. THOMAS PIKETTY & GABRIEL ZUCMAN, CAPITAL Is BACK: WEALTH-INCOME
RATIOS IN RICH COUNTRIES 1700-2010DATABOOK, tbls. Al, US.l (2013) (providing data on
ratios of national wealth to national income, and national income in the United States,
respectively).
21. See, e.g., Bhagat, supra note 17, at 8 (finding that "bank size is positively
correlated with risk-taking," and that "bank size has a consistent and significant negative
impact on the bank common stock to total assets ratio," suggesting that "banks engage in
excessive risk-taking mainly through increased leverage").
22. Omarova, supra note 6, at 1042; see also Macey & O'Hara, supra note 9, at
93 (observing the tension between the shareholder-wealth-maximization norm and the federal
government's preference that banks "refrain from engaging in excessive risk taking").
23. Macey & O'Hara, supra note 9, at 102.
24. For discussion of this literature, see Deniz Anginer, Corporate Governance
and Bank Insolvency Risk- International Evidence 4-7, 22 (World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper No. 7017, Sept. 2014),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/9903 1 14 68 14 96 73 38 5/pdf/WPS7017.pdf;
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers'Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247,267-69
(2010); Bruner, supra note 8, at 552-53; Femandes et al., supra note 7, (manuscript at
10-11); Ferrarini, supra note 7, at 7-8; Daniel Ferreira et al., Boards of Banks 11 (AXA
Working Paper Series No. 6, Discussion Paper No. 664, Jan. 2011),
http://www.lse.ac.uk/fmg/assets/documents/papers/discussion-papers/DP664.pdf; Stulz,
supra note 7, at 48; see also Hsiao-Jung Chen & Kuan-Ting Lin, How Do Banks Make the
Trade-Offs Among Risks? The Role of Corporate Governance (Mar. 2, 2017),
https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2923719 (finding that "[d]uring the
regular yield curve spread (YCS) period, management-controlled banks take less credit risk
and even less liquidity risk whereas shareholder-controlled banks encounter more liquidity
risk as they pursue more interest rate risk," while "[d]uring the inverted YCS period,
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these fundamental governance matters have largely gone unaddressed," or moved
in the wrong direction.26
As an institutional matter, this generalized failure to bring what we know
about financial firms' risk-taking to bear upon reform of their governance reflects
the fact that the largest and most powerful financial firms today are legally organized
as plain-vanilla corporations. Indeed, each of the five largest U.S. bank holding
companies is a Delaware corporation publicly traded on the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE), 7 meaning that each is governed by the standard suite of
corporate governance rules for a U.S. publicly traded company: Delaware corporate
law, federal securities regulation, and NYSE listing rules.28 The trend toward
applying standard corporate governance structures to U.S. financial firms began in
the 1970s, as regulatory constraints on the size, geographic reach, and service
offerings of commercial banks began to erode.2 9 Meanwhile, investment banks
began to abandon the risk-inhibiting partnership form in favor of corporate limited
liability." These developments ultimately reinforced one another through the rise of
modern financial holding companies following the 1999 Graham-Leach-Bliley Act,
which removed the Depression-era barrier between commercial and investment
management-controlled banks still opt for less credit risk-taking, but shareholder-controlled
banks are greatly exposed to risks and should thus be monitored by concerned authorities");
Glauco De Vita & Yun Luo, /hen Do Regulations Matter for BankRisk-Taking? An Analysis
of the Interaction Between External Regulation and Board Characteristics, CORP. Gov.
(2017), pt. 4.1 (finding that, among 493 commercial banks from 54 countries between 2001
and 2015, "[b]oard independence significantly increases bank risk-taking when interacting
with supervisory power").
25. See, e.g., Macey & O'Hara, supra note 9, at 86.
26. See Bruner, supra note 8, at 553-60. For discussion of post-crisis reforms
applicable to nonbank financial firms, and problems associated with the shift from entity-
based toward activities-based regulation, see generally Kress et al., supra note 17.
27. See JPMorgan Chase & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Dec. 31, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000001961718000057/corpIOk2Ol7.htm
(NYSE: JPM); Bank of America Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Dec. 31, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/70858/000007085818000009/bac-
1231201710xk.htm (NYSE: BAC); Wells Fargo & Co., Annual Report
(Form 10-K) (Dec. 31, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/72971/000007297118000272/wfc-
12312017xl0k.htm (NYSE: WFC); Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K)
(Dec. 31, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/83 1001/000083100118000040/c-
12312017xl0k.htm (NYSE: C); Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Annual Report
(Form 10-K) (Dec. 31, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data886982/0001193 125 18056383/d480167d10k.htm
(NYSE: GS).
28. See STEPHEN J. CHOI & A. C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
ANALYSIS 12,403 (4th ed. 2015); Renee B. Adams & Hamid Mehran, Bank Board Structure
and Performance: Evidence for Large Bank Holding Companies, 21 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION
243, 246-48 (2012); Macey & O'Hara, supra note 9, at 93; About the Division of
Corporations, DELAWARE.GOV https://corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last visited
Dec. 14, 2017).
29. See Bruner, supra note 8, at 549.
30. See id.
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banking. 1 In light of such regulatory and organizational shifts, it is hardly surprising
that financial firms would, over the same period, tend to grow substantially larger
and substantially boost risk-taking, in pursuit of returns for their own shareholders.32
Likewise, it is hardly surprising that reform efforts leaving these dynamics
untouched would fail to produce meaningful improvements. "If anything," as
Natasha Sain and Lawrence Summers have found, "measures of volatility appear
to be higher postcrisis than they were precrisis," as do measures of market
expectation regarding future volatility.33
The ramifications of the critical governance distinction between financial
and nonfinancial firms have largely gone unrecognized in debates regarding post-
crisis financial reform,34 and this Essay explores two of the resulting tensions,
toward the aim of charting a way forward. The first tension relates to the role of
equity capital in financial firms.35 We are increasingly relying on heightened equity
capital as a buffer against shocks and a means of mitigating risks associated with
excessive leverage on financial firm balance sheets. Yet, it is widely understood that
equity holders-more so than any other constituency in a financial firm -prefer
greater risk-taking, and that equity holders' risk preference only becomes stronger
as a firm approaches insolvency. This inherent tension has received insufficient
public attention,36 and our knowledge of who, precisely, is providing the increased
capital cushion in post-crisis financial firms remains remarkably thin-meaning that
we know little of their preferences and incentives and cannot coherently assess
whether the benefits of their involvement exceed the costs.
The second tension relates to the role of independent directors in financial
firms.37 We are increasingly relying on greater board-level independence as a buffer
31. See id.; see also FOROOHAR, supra note 17, at 37 (describing the tendency,
beginning in the 1980s, to view finance as "a business unto itself, rather than just a catalyst
to other industries").
32. See Bruner, supra note 8, at 549-53; Yadav, supra note 6, (manuscript at
14-16).
33. See Natasha Sarin & Lawrence H. Summers, Understanding Bank Risk
through Market Measures, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2016, at 57, 58-59.
Their examination of volatility includes "historical stock price volatility, expected volatility
as implied by traded options, beta-the standard measure of comovement with the market-
and a measure of contribution to systemic risk." Id. Their examination of market expectation
focuses on "expected returns" as reflected in "credit default swap (CDS) spreads as a measure
of the riskiness of unsecured bank debt, preferred stock yields, and price-earnings (PE) ratios
as a proxy for expected stock market returns." Id. at 59; see also Yalman Onaran, BankProfits
Near Pre-Crisis Peak in U.S. Despite All the Rules, BLOOMBERG QUINT (July 21, 2017,
5:00AM), https://www.bloombergquint.com/business/2017/07/2 1/bank-profits-near-pre-
crisis-peak-in-u-s-de spite -all-the -rule s#gs.HODIPio.
34. See, e.g., Adams & Mehran, supra note 28, at 244, 246 (observing that post-
crisis reforms "do not allow for the possibility that bank governance has unique features" and
arguing that "proposals that are largely motivated by research on non-financial firms are
unlikely to be effective"); Ferreira et al., supra note 24, at 2 (observing that post-crisis reforms
proceed with little information about "the characteristics of boards of banks," and "how
existing regulations shape the structure of bank boards").
35. See infra Part I.
36. For a noteworthy exception, see generally Yadav, supra note 6.
37. See infra Part II.
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between the risk-management function and senior corporate management as a means
of fostering more concerted attention to overall risk positions in these increasingly
far-flung firms. Yet, there is a growing post-crisis empirical literature that tends to
associate greater reliance on independent directors (and other shareholder-centric
governance structures) with excessive risk-taking in the run-up to the crisis and bad
outcomes in its aftermath.38 Conversely, there is mounting empirical evidence that,
regardless of the performance benefits independent directors might offer in
nonfinancial contexts, they may do affirmative harm in highly complex settings
where outsiders generally lack the requisite technical knowledge to advise and
monitor effectively.39 This inherent tension has likewise received insufficient public
attention, and little thought has been devoted to how well (or badly) such widely
embraced reforms might translate to the unique context of financial firm
governance.
Following a brief exploration of each of these fundamental tensions, this
Essay concludes with a discussion of pitfalls and trade-offs that are involved with
transplantation of popular nonfinancial governance reforms to the financial
context.40 I conclude that this tendency reflects a cramped contemporary conception
of corporate governance, prompting knee-jerk resort to the familiar, and that until
we develop a clearer understanding of the risk incentives and capacities that
financial firm shareholders and directors bring to the table, our best option may be
to affirmatively condition their incentives through the governance structure itself.
I. CAPITAL REGULATION AND EQUITY HOLDERS' RISK
PREFERENCES
A. Shareholders as Equity Buffer
The rationale motivating post-crisis reforms aimed at bolstering financial
firm capital is straightforward enough. The idea is that "more capital should make
banks better able to absorb losses with their own resources, without becoming
insolvent or necessitating a bailout with public funds," and that additional capital
will "curb incentives for excessive risk taking."41 Such reforms reflect the
conclusion that pre-crisis capital requirements were insufficiently stringent, both
quantitatively and qualitatively, as evidenced by the fact that many banks receiving
public bailouts "appeared to be in compliance with minimum capital requirements
shortly before and even during the crisis."42 Although the United States has
historically imposed more stringent capital requirements than Europe has,43
heightened capital requirements have featured prominently in post-crisis reform
38. See supra note 24.
39. See infra Section II.B.
40. See infra Conclusions.
41. Ash Demirguc-Kunt et al., Bank Capital: Lessons from the Financial Crisis 2
(World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5473, Nov. 2010),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/568301468325454646/pdf/WPS5473.pdf.
42. See id.
43. See Basel 3, an International Capital-Adequacy Standard, Is Unloved but
Much Needed, ECONOMIST (May 4, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/special-
report/21721497-international-bank-regulation-grinding-towards-completionor-possibly-
halt-basel-3 [hereinafter Basel 3, ECONOMIST].
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packages on both sides of the Atlantic,44 reflected most prominently in the Basel III
framework and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. "
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision46 has generally embraced a
stakeholder-oriented conception of banks as corporate entities,47 which broadly
dovetails with the stability-oriented focus on the sufficiency of capital in the Basel
III framework adopted in the wake of the crisis. The problems being "excessive on-
and off-balance sheet leverage" and "a gradual erosion of the level and quality of
the capital base," the solution, the Basel Committee reasoned, must involve reforms
to "raise both the quality and quantity of the regulatory capital base and enhance the
risk coverage of the capital framework."48 Politically, the central benefit is that
failing financial firms can, as the Economist described it, "be automatically
recapitalised by bailing in investors, without troubling taxpayers."49
Prior iterations of Basel's capital-adequacy regime had required common
equity amounting to just 2% of risk-weighted assets, and Basel III substantially
increased the requirement.50 Emphasizing its "greater focus on common equity, the
highest quality component of a bank's capital," the Basel III framework requires
common equity amounting to at least 4.5% of risk-weighted assets. To qualify as
common equity, the instrument must (among other things) be "the most
subordinated claim in liquidation of the bank," and represent "the issued capital that
44. See Baker et al., supra note 12, at 8; Yadav, supra note 6, (manuscript at 4).
45. As of this writing, the fate of the Dodd-Frank Act and various post-crisis
reforms remains unclear. See, e.g., The Financial CHOICE Act. Creating Hope and
Opportunity for Investors, Consumers and Entrepreneurs, FN. SERVS. COMMITTEE,
https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/financial-choice act executivesummary
final.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2018) (executive summary). For additional background, see
Editorial Board, Bank Health, Imperiled, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2017),
https://mobile.nytimes.com/2017/07/03/opinion/federal-reserve-banks-stress-test.html;
Robert Hockett, Let's Get Real About 'Financial CHOICE,' FORBES (June 11, 2017, 8:21
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhockett/2017/06/1 1/lets-get-real-about-financial-
choice/; Alan Rappeport, Bill to Erase Some Dodd Frank Banking Rules Passes in House,
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (June 8, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/08/business/dealbook/house-financial-regulations-dodd-
frank.html; Jeremy Venook, The House Takes Another Step Toward Repealing Dodd Frank,
ATLANTIC (June 9, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/06/financial-
choice-act-house/52985 1/; see also infra notes 56, 114.
46. The Basel Committee is "the primary global standard setter for the prudential
regulation of banks and provides a forum for cooperation on banking supervisory matters."
See Basel Committee Charter, BANK INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/charter.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2018).
47. See Ferrarini, supra note 7, at 19-20.
48. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILWNT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS 1-2 (rev. June 2011)
[hereinafter BASEL 111].
49. See Basel 3, ECONOMIST, supra note 43.
50. See Thomas B. Sanders, The Unintended Consequences of Basel III: Reducing
Performance Ratios andLimiting BankAccess to Equity Funding Markets, Q. J. FN. & ACCT.
Winter 2015, at 101; see also Baker et al., supra note 12, at 8; Demirguc-Kunt et al., supra
note 41, at 3; Basel 3, ECONOMIST, supra note 43; Yadav, supra note 6, (manuscript at
21-25).
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takes the first and proportionately greatest share of any losses as they occur."l
Additionally, in order to "ensure that banks build up capital buffers outside periods
of stress which can be drawn down as losses are incurred," the framework requires
a "capital conservation buffer" of another 2.5% of common equity, imposing
distribution constraints that phase in to the degree that a bank falls below the 7%
total.5 2 Beyond these baselines, then, Basel III provides latitude to national
authorities to apply a "countercyclical buffer" if "excess aggregate credit growth is
judged to be associated with a build-up of system-wide risk," requiring up to an
additional 2.5% common equity (hence up to 9.5% total) that effectively increases
the capital conservation buffer for determining distribution constraints.5 3 The capital
conservation buffer may be increased by another 2.5%, then (hence up to 12% total),
for so-called globally systemically important banks (G-SIBs).5 4 Basel III also
introduced a minimum leverage ratio of 3% to "constrain the build-up of leverage
in the banking sector" and "reinforce the risk based requirements with a simple, non-
risk based 'backstop' measure.1
5 5
The United States, for its part, has taken a more stem approach with its
largest banks. The Dodd-Frank Act requires heightened prudential regulation of
banks and other financial firms with total consolidated assets of $250 billion or
more, including "risk-based capital requirements and leverage limits, '5 6 and the
51. BASEL I1, supra note 48, at 12-15.
52. See id. at 54-57. The idea is that in times when the capital buffers have "been
drawn down, one way banks should look to rebuild them is through reducing discretionary
distributions of earnings," such as dividends, share buybacks, and bonus payments. Id. at 54.
53. See id. at 57-60.
54. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY
IMPORTANT BANKS: UPDATED ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY AND THE HIGHER Loss
ABSORBENCY REQUIEMENT 12-15 (July 2013), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs255.pdf
[hereinafter BASEL G-SIBs]. Systemic significance reflects "the impact that a bank's failure
can have on the global financial system and wider economy, rather than the risk that a failure
could occur," and the indicators include size, interconnectedness, substitutability of their
services, global activity, and complexity. Id. at 5-6.
55. See BASEL I1, supra note 48, at 61-63.
56. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 165(a)-(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1423-24 (2010); Press Release, Bd. of Governors
of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Fed. Reserve Board Approves Final Rule Strengthening Supervision
and Regulation of Large U. S. Bank Holding Cos. and Foreign Banking Orgs. (Feb. 18, 2014),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20 14021 8a.htm. In May
2018, the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act was signed
into law, raising the threshold from $50 billion to $250 billion (while providing that any
designated G-SIB would be included "regardless of asset size"). Economic Growth,
Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 115-174, § 401(a), (f), 132 Stat.
1296, 1356-57, 1359 (2018). The Act takes effect after 18 months, except for bank holding
companies with less than $100 billion in total consolidated assets, for which it takes effect
immediately. § 401(d), 132 Stat. at 1358-59. For a critique of this change (written prior to its
enactment), see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Raising SIFI Threshold to $250B Ignores Lessons of
Past Crises, AM. BANKER: BANKTHINK BLOG (Feb. 7, 2018, 9:30 AM),
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/raising-sifi-threshold-to-250b-ignores-lessons-of-
past-crises ("While Congress would be justified in raising the $50 billion line to $100 billion,
the proposed $250 billion figure is much too high and would undermine the Federal Reserve
Board's ability to regulate SIFIs effectively under the Dodd-Frank Act.").
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Federal Reserve Board (Fed) has taken advantage of the Basel Committee's
invitation to impose higher G-SIB surcharges. 7 In 2015, the Fed approved a rule
imposing surcharges on G-SIBs ranging up to 4.5% to force these firms, expected
to include the largest U.S. bank holding companies, "to bear the costs that their
failure would impose on others .... [T]hey must either hold substantially more
capital, reducing the likelihood that they will fail, or else they must shrink their
systemic footprint, reducing the harm that their failure would do to our financial
system."
58
The Dodd-Frank Act also created the "orderly liquidation authority"
(OLA), which "extended the FDIC's authority to resolve failed institutions beyond
commercial banks to include the entire bank holding company and all firms
designated as Systemically Important Financial Institutions. '5 9 While this process
"has never been triggered," rendering its application and viability conjectural, 6 the
OLA expressly covers bank holding companies and Fed-supervised, nonbank
financial finns. 61 Triggering conditions for this process include when "the financial
company is in default or in danger of default," its failure "would have serious
adverse effects on financial stability," and there is "no viable private sector
alternative. '62 The express aim is to mitigate risks to U.S. "financial stability," to
reduce "moral hazard" associated with bailouts, and to ensure that "creditors and
shareholders will bear the losses" from financial firm failures.63 Indeed, consistent
with the logic of increased-equity capital, the OLA expressly requires that
"shareholders of a covered financial company do not receive payment until after all
57. See BASEL G-SIBs, supra note 54, at 12.
58. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve
Board Approves Final Rule Requiring the Largest, Most Systemically Important U.S. Bank
Holding Companies to Further Strengthen Their Capital Positions (July 20, 2015),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20 1 50720a. htm (quoting
then-Fed Chair Janet Yellen). As of July 2015, it was expected that designated G-SIBs would
include Bank of America, Bank of New York Mellon, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan
Chase, Morgan Stanley, State Street, and Wells Fargo. The surcharges were expected to
become "fully effective on January 1, 2019." Id.; see also 12 C.F.R. §§ 217.400-217.406
(2018) (establishing criteria for identifying G-SIBs and calculating surcharges); § 252.32
(2018) (requiring bank holding companies with $50 billion or more in assets to hold capital
as required by Fed regulations "relating to capital planning and stress tests"). For additional
background see Joseph G. Haubrich & Charlotte DeKoning, Sizing Up Systemic Risk, FED.
RES. BANK CLEVELAND (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.clevelandfed.org/en/newsroom-and-
events/publications/economic-commentary/2017 -economic -commentarie s/ec-201713-
sizing-up-sy stemic -risk.aspx.
59. Aaron Klein, A Primer on Dodd Frank's Orderly Liquidation Authority,
BROOKINGS: UP-FRONT (June 5, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-
front/2017/06/05/a-primer-on-dodd-franks-orderly -liquidation-authority/.
60. Id. For a skeptical assessment of the OLA's capacity to prevent future
taxpayer-funded bailouts, see generally Lubben & Wilmarth, supra note 17.
61. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 201(a)(11), 124 Stat. at 1443-44 (2010).
62. § 203(b)(1)-(3), 124 Stat. at 1451.
63. § 204(a), 124 Stat. at 1454-55.
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other claims, ' ' 64 and that "[t]axpayers shall bear no losses from the exercise of any
authority under this title.
65
B. Shareholders and Financial Risk-Taking
There is certainly empirical support for the claim that financial firm capital
buffers required improvement. For example, a World Bank policy research paper
finds "support for the hypothesis that better capitalized banks experienced a smaller
decline in their equity value during the crisis" (particularly among "larger banks")-
a finding "consistent with the spirit of capital regulation," supporting "the view that
greater emphasis on Tier 1 capital and common equity is likely to be effective. ' 66 In
a sense, this policy prescription represents a (limited) turn back toward the historical
norm of higher bank capital,6' and banks today are widely considered to be better
capitalized than they were before the crisis. 68
However, from a corporate governance perspective, reliance on equity
capital providers as a means of reducing risk-taking ought to give us pause. As a
threshold matter, shareholders are widely understood to be the corporate
constituency with the strongest risk-taking incentives in all corporate firms due to
the shield of limited liability, which greatly reduces the downside relative to the
upside. 69 This risk preference is augmented in the banking context, where deposit
insurance and implicit "too-big-to-fail" guarantees soften the brake on risk-taking
that creditor monitoring might otherwise have imposed. At the same time, it is
critical to recognize that the shareholders' preference for risk will only tend to grow
as the firm approaches insolvency-by hypothesis, the circumstance with which we
are most concerned.7 1 The potential for bad outcomes is borne out by a growing
empirical literature tending to link shareholder-centric corporate governance
structures in financial firms with excessive risk-taking in the run-up to the crisis and
poor performance in its aftermath.72 Accordingly, it is incumbent on those
64. § 206(2), 124 Stat. at 1459; see also Yadav, supra note 6, (manuscript at
24-25).
65. See § 214(c), 124 Stat. at 1518; see also Supervision andRegulation Letter SR
15-15: Supervisory Concerns Related to Shareholder Protection Arrangements, BD.
GOVERNORS FED. REs. Sys. (Dec. 3, 2015),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/srl515.htm (reflecting the Fed's
"concerns related to arrangements ... to protect the financial investments made by
shareholders" that "could have negative implications on a holding company's capital or
financial position").
66. See Demirguc-Kunt et al., supra note 41, at 3, 13.
67. See Sanders, supra note 50, at 3-4 (observing that banks in the 19th century
"were required to fund assets with 50% capital," but that following the advent of the Federal
Reserve System and deposit insurance, "capital dropped steadily to single digits where it is
today").
68. See, e.g., Baker et al., supra note 12, at 2, 16, 22-23; Basel 3, ECONOMIST,
supra note 43.
69. See Brner, supra note 1, at 312, 317.
70. See id.; see also Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 24, at 26647.
71. See, e.g., Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., 1991
Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *108 n.55 (Del. Ch. 1991).
72. See supra note 24.
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identifying risk-preferring shareholders as the antidote to excessive risk-taking in
financial firms to articulate how this counterintuitive mechanism might work.
To be sure, increasing the capital buffer does not intrinsically alter the total
voting power or governance authority possessed by shareholders as a matter of
corporate law73-but it may alter how that power is used to the extent that additional
equity requires the involvement of new, and qualitatively different, forms of equity
capital providers. In this light, Yesha Yadav is quite right to ask who, precisely,
these equity capital providers are; specifically, "which actors, in fact, constitute the
major equity holders of large banks."74 Yadav's empirical study arrives at the
intuitively plausible conclusion that heightened capital for mega-financial
institutions requires the involvement of mega-asset managers. Focusing on "the 26
largest and most systemic U.S. banks," Yadav finds that over a six-year period the
rate of blockholding in these entities rose substantially.75 In particular, "[w]hereas
Vanguard was a blockholder at just one of the surveyed banks in 2010/11, it had
assumed 25 positions by 2016/17. "176 Blackrock, meanwhile, rose from 10 to 25
blockholdings, and State Street rose from I to 12.
7 7
These are among the most significant asset managers globally, confirming
that sufficient equity capital for the big banks will, as a practical matter, have to
come from the only private entities on Earth that can make the big banks look modest
in size 78-a concerning development for a least a couple reasons. Altering the
identity of the big banks' capital providers could alter how shareholder powers are
exercised in these institutions, and the governance incentives of these mega-asset
managers remain imperfectly understood. While these institutions have traditionally
remained passive, their extraordinary holdings obviously give them capacity to exert
substantial influence over financial firm managers, and they stand to gain from
greater risk-taking just as other financial firm shareholders do.79 And to the extent
73. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2018) (measuring requisite votes for
shareholder action by reference to threshold amounts of "shares present in person or
represented by proxy," not by the number or value of outstanding shares).
74. Yadav, supra note 6, (manuscript at 5).
75. Id. at 6-7.
76. Id. at 6.
77. See id. at 7.
78. As of July 2018, the largest mutual fund companies were BlackRock Funds
($6.23 trillion AUM), Vanguard ($5.10 trillion AUM), Charles Schwab ($3.36 trillion AUM),
State Street Global Advisors ($2.73 trillion AUM), Fidelity Investments ($2.56 trillion
AUM), and JP Morgan ($2.03 trillion AUM). See Mutual Fund Directory: 2018, MUTUAL
FUND DIRECTORY, http://mutualffnddirectory.org/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2018) (ranking
mutual fund companies by assets under management); see also Top 400 Asset Managers
2016: Global Assets Now (56.3trn, INV. & PENSIONS EUR.,
https://www.ipe.com/reports/special-reports/top-400-asset-managers/top-400-asset-
managers-2016-global-assets-now-563trn/10013542.fullarticle (last visited Sept. 22, 2017);
The Top 400 Asset Managers, INV. & PENSIONS EUR. 23,
https://www.ipe.com/Uploads/j/t/t/Top-400-2016.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2017) (listing
BlackRock, Vanguard Asset Management, State Street Global Advisors, Fidelity
Investments, BNY Mellon Investment Management, and J.P. Morgan Asset Management as
the six largest asset managers globally as of Dec. 31, 2015).
79. See, e.g., Yadav, supra note 6, (manuscript at 5-7, 29-33, 47-50).
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that such risks are ultimately borne by the retail investors providing the savings for
these asset managers to invest, 80 the systemic consequences of financial firm failure
have not been mitigated so much as relabeled; retail investors continue to pay the
price, only they now do so wearing their "saver" hats rather than their "taxpayer"
hats.
A growing literature is exploring the interrelationship between increased
concentration of shareholding, on the one hand, and passive investment strategies,
on the other. Perhaps the critical development has been the emergence of the "index
fund," a form of mutual fund that (as the name implies) simply tracks a specified
index, and the "exchange-traded fund" (ETF), which also generally tracks an index
but trades on an exchange, much like common stock. In each case, the central
attraction has been cost reduction through elimination of active portfolio
management,81 and in the years following the crisis "investors sold holdings of
actively managed equity mutual funds worth roughly U.S. $800 billion, while at the
same time buying passively managed funds to the tune of approximately U.S. $1
trillion." By 2015, "passive index funds," including both index funds and ETFs,
"managed total assets invested in equities of more than U.S. $4 trillion," and "this
large and growing industry is dominated by just three asset management firms:
BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street."82 Contributing to the substantial
concentration of equity ownership in U.S. public companies over recent decades,83
index funds and ETFs have capitalized on the scalability of passive investment,
permitting larger funds to compete effectively through lower fees.84 BlackRock,
80. See id. at 9-10.
81. See INV. CO. INST., 2017 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 91, 97-98
(57th ed. 2017), https://www.ici.org/pdf/2017 factbook.pdf; Benjamin Braun, From
Performativity to Political Economy: Index Investing, ETFs and Asset Manager Capitalism,
21 NEW POL. ECON. 257, 263-64 (2016); Patrick Jahnke, Voice Versus Exit: The Causes and
Consequence of Increasing Shareholder Concentration 4-5 (Sept. 18, 2017),
https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=3027058; Asjylyn Loder & Inyoung
Hwang, 'Passive' Investing Can Be a Lot More Active Than You Think, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 19, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/passive-investing-can-be-a-lot-
more-active-than-you-think- 1476882001.
82. Jan Fichtner et al., Hidden Power of the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-
Concentration of Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 Bus. & POL. 298, 299,
303-04 (2017); see also INV. CO. INST., supra note 81, at 8-10, 18-19, 44-46, 94-97,
180-82, 211-14; Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of
Institutional Investors, 31 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 89, 94 (2017); Braun, supra note 81, at 263;
Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493, 496, 509
(2018); John Morley, Too Big to Be Activist, S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at
3-4, 8), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=3225555; Giovanni Strampelli,
Are Passive Index Funds Active Owners? Corporate Governance Consequences
of Passive Investing 2, 8 (May 30, 2018),
https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=3187159.
83. See Jahnke, supra note 81, at 5 (observing that "in 1970 it was individual
investors that controlled around 80% of all outstanding shares in the United States," but that
by 2017 "institutional investors own around 73% of the outstanding shares of the top 1000
US companies by market capitalisation").
84. See id. at 9; Strampelli, supra note 82, at 7.
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Vanguard, and State Street together account for "a stunning 71 percent of the entire
ETF market" and "over 90 percent of all [AUM] in passive equity funds."85
Yet, the governance impacts remain unclear. 6 While these three asset
managers "side with management in more than 90 percent of votes," they do
sometimes oppose management on elections, perhaps suggesting that they want to
"have the ear of management" in order to exert "private influence"-dynamics that
are inherently difficult to quantify and predict.8 7 While it is widely thought that
indexing could undercut activism by foreclosing an important predicate for such
activity-i.e., threat of exit88-and that index funds have little incentive to invest in
monitoring corporate governance when they cannot fully capture the benefits of
doing so,8 9 Vanguard's founder, John Bogle, nevertheless emphasizes that "[t]here's
passive strategies and there's passive investors. And these are two different
things." 90 Indeed, to the degree that exit becomes less viable in a world of increasing
ownership concentration, one could imagine institutions becoming more active in
corporate governance as an alternative means of complying with fiduciary duties
owed to their own investors. 91 BlackRock alone "holds 5 percent blocks in more
than one-half of all listed companies in the United States," and "when combined,
BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street constitute the single largest shareholder in
at least 40 percent of all [U.S.] listed companies" and approximately 88% of S&P
500 companies. 92 Accordingly, it is unsurprising that the voting practices of such
institutions may often prove outcome-determinative. 93 Major asset managers
themselves, meanwhile, report nontrivial levels of corporate governance
85. Fichtner et al., supra note 82, at 303-04.
86. See, e.g., id. at 300; Joseph A. McCahery et al., Behind the Scenes: The
Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors, 71 J. Fm. 2905, 2905 (2016).
87. See Fichtner et al., supra note 82, at 317-20, 323; see also Sarah Krouse et al.,
Meet the New Corporate Power Brokers: Passive Investors, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 25, 2016, 10:41 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-corporate-power-brokers-
passive-investors-1477320101; McCahery et al., supra note 86, at 2912-13 (finding similar
dynamics across institutional investors). On the conflict of interest arising from fund
managers' desire to secure lucrative pension-management business from public companies,
see Bebchuk, Cohen & Hirst, supra note 82, at 102-03; Lund, supra note 82, at 513; Morley,
supra note 82, at 25-26.
88. See, e.g., Fichtner et al., supra note 82, at 307; Jahnke, supra note 81, at 6,
11-14; McCahery et al., supra note 86, at 2918-20; Morley, supra note 82, at 28; Strampelli,
supra note 82, at 3, 12.
89. The fact that "beneficial governance intervention will improve the
performance of all funds tracking the index" means that "any investment in governance would
benefit competitor funds while simultaneously driving up the passive fund's costs" relative
to those same competitors. Lund, supra note 82, at 511; see also Bebchuk, Cohen & Hirst,
supra note 82, at 98; Strampelli, supra note 82, at 2, 11-12. Accordingly, it is unsurprising
that such funds have invested little in monitoring corporate governance. See Bebchuk, Cohen
& Hirst, supra note 82, at 100; Lund, supra note 82, at 516.
90. Loder & Hwang, supra note 81 (quoting Bogle).
91. See Jahnke, supra note 81, at 8. But see generally Morley, supra note 82
(arguing that index funds will likely remain passive because activism would expose them to
burdensome regulation and exacerbate conflicts across their funds and clients).
92. Fichtner et al., supra note 82, at 311-13.
93. See Krouse et al., supra note 87.
2018] CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM 973
involvement 4 -ostensibly with a long-term time horizon in mind9-and expressly
prefer informal means of "engagement" prior to pursuing more visible and
confrontational strategies.96
Yadav argues that mega-asset managers fitting this profile may be ideal
providers of the enhanced capital buffer now required for mega-financial firms-
because their broad investment exposure to the financial sector renders "investments
in information and analysis [money] well-spent. '9 7 But it is far from obvious that
these entities will play a productive role. As Yadav acknowledges, the case remains
speculative because these asset managers "have only recently deepened the
economic stakes within the banking sector."98 Moreover, their purported long-term
94. See, e.g., BLACKROCK INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP REPORT: VOTING &
ENGAGEMENT QUARTERLY STATISTICS, JULY 1, 2016 - JUNE 30, 2017 (2017) (reporting 1,274
"engagements" between July 2016 and June 2017, and voting against approximately 10% of
management proposals in the Americas); Our Engagement Efforts and Proxy Voting: An
Update, VANGUARD GROUP, INC., https ://about.vanguard. com/investment-
stewardship/update-on-voting/index.html (last visited July 21, 2017) (reporting 817
"engagements" between July 2015 and June 2016, and voting against approximately 8% of
management proposals).
95. See, e.g., BLACKROCK, GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & ENGAGEMENT
PRINCIPLES 3 (June 2014); FIDELITY INVS., FIDELITY FUNDS' PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES 1
(Jan. 2017); STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS, 2017 GLOBAL PROXY VOTING AND
ENGAGEMENT PRINCIPLES 1, 5 (Mar. 2017); Environmental and Social Concerns, VANGUARD
GROUP, INC., https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/social-concerns-
investing/index.html (last visited July 21, 2017); Vanguard's Approach to Investment
Stewardship, VANGUARD GROUP, INC., https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/
(last visited July 21, 2017); Vanguard's Proxy Voting Guidelines, VANGUARD GROUP, INC.,
https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/voting-guidelines/index.html (last
visited July 21, 2017); Vanguard's Responsible Investment Policy, VANGUARD GROUP, INC.,
https ://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/responsible-investment-
policy/index.html (last visited July 21, 2017).
96. See, e.g., BLACKROCK, supra note 95, at 2 (characterizing "engagement" as a
means of gaining information and sharing "our philosophy and approach to investment," and
describing votes against or withheld from management resolutions as "a signal that we are
concerned" that management "have not responded adequately to shareholder concerns"); Our
Governance and Executive Compensation Principles, VANGUARD GROUP, INC.,
https ://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/corporate-govemance/index.html (last
visited July 21, 2017) (reporting that "we can often accomplish more through dialogue than
through the ballot"); Vanguard's Approach to Investment Stewardship, supra note 95
(characterizing "engagement" as giving "the opportunity to target nuanced feedback and
message more precisely than does voting alone"); Vanguard's Responsible Investment Policy,
supra note 95 (characterizing their approach as "quiet diplomacy focused on results");
FIDELITY INVS., supra note 95, at 3 (reporting that Fidelity will withhold votes in board
elections when management "has not adequately addressed concerns communicated ... in the
process of discussing executive compensation'); STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS, supra
note 95, at 2-3 (prioritizing "direct dialogue"); see also Jahnke, supra note 81, at 15-17;
Lund, supra note 82, at 501-02; Strampelli, supra note 82, at 13-20.
97. See Yadav, supra note 6, (manuscript at 53); see also Fichtner et al., supra
note 82, at 308-10.
98. See Yadav, supra note 6, (manuscript at 50); see also Strampelli, supra note
82, at 22-26.
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focus remains "questionable" to the extent that the performance of such asset
managers themselves "is benchmarked daily."99
However, even if we were to assume that these asset managers were
prepared to engage and incentivized to do so with long-term stability in mind, it is
critical to recognize that this category of institutions might or might not continue to
provide the bulk of financial firms' increased capital buffer moving forward. As
Yadav additionally observes, a "mandate" to engage with financial firm governance
could prompt these asset managers to "pull back from the banking system," in which
case "other capital providers will take their place"-potentially including
institutions "susceptible to the perverse incentives that usually afflict bank
shareholders."1 Here we confront the reality that investors vary enormously in their
capacities to provide truly "patient capital," and that stated investment goals may or
may not provide clear indications of the operative timeframe over which various
categories of investors actually seek financial returns. 01
Simply put, there can be no assurance that equity capital providers will play
a productive role in reducing financial firm risk-taking, short of imposing real curbs
on the generalized preference for risk that prevails among all financial firm
shareholders. 2 Otherwise, reliance on increased equity capital to mitigate the
systemic consequences of financial firm failure can be no more effective than our
own capacities to predict who will provide that equity capital over time, and what
their peculiar incentives and interests might be. The answers to these questions
remain unknown and are perhaps unknowable.
II. BOARD INDEPENDENCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT
A. Independent Directors as Risk-Management Buffer
Corporate boards of directors classically perform both advising and
monitoring functions, and the principal aim of mandating a certain percentage of
"independent" directors is to improve the monitoring function for the benefit of
minority shareholders. The idea is that the presence of people who (by definition)
99. See Jahnke, supra note 81, at 19. On the historical trend toward accelerating
portfolio turnover among institutional investors, see LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE
MYTH: How PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE
PUBLIC 66-67 (2012).
100. See Yadav, supra note 6, (manuscript at 55-56).
101. See Richard Deeg & lain Hardie, What Is Patient Capital and Who Supplies
It?, 14 Socio-ECON. REV. 627, 629-32 (2016).
102. Such initiatives might include (re)introduction of multiple-liability rules for
shareholders, reinforced by an enhanced duty of care for boards. See generally Bruner, supra
note 8; infra Conclusions. See also Macey & O'Hara, supra note 9, at 98-101; Steven L.
Schwarcz & Aleaha Jones, Corporate Governance of SIFI Risk-Taking: An International
Research Agenda, in CROSS-BORDER BANK RESOLUTION (Bob Wessels & Matthias Haentjens
eds., forthcoming 2017-2018) (manuscript at 10-11),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2972340 (arguing that if "the current
regulatory framework does not effectively control systematic externalities, changing the
corporate governance norm may be a valuable regulatory supplement"). An alternative, quasi-
regulatory approach would be to give the U.S. government a "golden share" in certain
financial institutions. See generally Omarova, supra note 6.
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are not employed by the company will improve governance because these
individuals will be more likely to assess the business objectively and voice their
views assertively, without deferring to a domineering CEO.103
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began recommending
that audit committees consist of independent directors as early as 1940.104 However,
the trend toward greater board independence sharply picked up pace with reforms
that followed the massive accounting frauds and ensuing bankruptcies at Enron,
WorldCom, and other companies in the early 2000s-notably through the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 and amended stock-exchange rules.105 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
itself requires all listed company boards to have fully independent audit
committees. 106 The listing rules of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and
NASDAQ go further, however, by requiring majority-independent boards 10 7 and
fully independent compensation and nomination committees, 108 applying stringent
independence tests essentially requiring "that the board of directors determine that
a nominee has no material direct or indirect relationship with the listed company." 109
By 2008, the percentage of independent directors had reached 82%, reinforced by
more demanding independence tests, 1 0 and these trends have been accompanied by
changes in how boards tend to operate. Notably, it has been found that "52% of
board activity in S&P 1500 firms takes place at the committee level after the
103. See, e.g., Ran Duchin et al., IThen Are Outside Directors Effective?, 96 J. FIN.
ECON. 195, 195-96 (2010); see also STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 78 (2012); Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Independent Director
Model Broken?, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 775, 788 (2014); Nicola Faith Sharpe, Process Over
Structure: An Organizational Behavior Approach to Improving Corporate Boards, 85 S. CAL.
L. REv. 261,265,269-74 (2012).
104. See Kevin D. Chen & Andy Wu, The Structure of Board Committees 5
(Harvard Bus. Sch. Working Paper No. 17-032, 2016),
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication"/ 2OFiles/17-032 22ea9e7a-4f26-4645-af3d-
042f2b4e058c.pdf; see also Karmel, supra note 103, at 775-84 (providing a historical
discussion of the SEC's views on board independence).
105. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 103, at 77-83; Chen & Wu, supra note 104, at 5,
13, 17-18; Duchin et al., supra note 103, at 197-98; Ferreira et al., supra note 24, at 33-35;
Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, "Captured Boards ": The Rise of "Super Directors" and the Case
for a Board Suite, 2017 WIs. L. REv. 19, 25-27; Usha Rodrigues, A Conflict Primacy Model
of the Public Board, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1051, 1060.
106. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745,
775-77 (2002); see also New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual § 303A.06;
NASDAQ Stock Market Equity Rule 5605(c)(2)(A).
107. See New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual § 303A.01;
NASDAQ Stock Market Equity Rule 5605(b)(1).
108. See New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual
§§ 303A.04-303A.05; NASDAQ Stock Market Equity Rules 5605(d)(2)(A), 5605(e)(1)(A).
109. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 83 (2d ed. 2009); see also New
York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual § 303A.02; NASDAQ Stock Market Equity
Rule 5605(a)(2).
110. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 103, at 78-79; see also Theodore N. Mirvis &
William Savitt, The Dangers of Independent Directors, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 481, 481 (2016)
(reporting data from the Spencer Stuart Board Index indicating that by 2014 "58% of boards
had only one non-independent director, 84% had two or fewer, and 94% had three or fewer").
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implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley," '111 and that the reforms described above
prompted a spike in the number of committees and multiple-committee assignments
for independent directors.112
In the more recent wave of post-crisis reforms, independent directors are
relied upon to perform a related, though more specific, function: to act as a buffer
between the more robust risk-management apparatus contemplated by such reform
packages, on the one hand, and senior management, on the other. In the United
States, this has taken the form of a requirement that certain publicly traded bank
holding companies and Fed-supervised, nonbank financial firms have risk
committees "responsible for the oversight of the enterprise-wide risk management
practices"-and these committees must "include such number of independent
directors as the [Federal Reserve] Board of Governors may determine appropriate,"
with "at least 1 risk management expert having experience in identifying, assessing,
and managing risk exposures of large, complex firms." '113 The Federal Reserve has
required a risk committee with an independent board chair and at least one expert
for publicly traded bank holding companies with "total consolidated assets of $10
billion or more,"114 and if assets are $50 billion or more then the bank holding
company must also "appoint a chief risk officer" who reports "directly to both the
risk committee and chief executive officer."'115 Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve has
signaled greater focus on the quality of financial firm governance in other ways,
including by prohibiting Wells Fargo from further asset growth until the firm can
demonstrate that the quality of its board-level governance has improved,116 though
it remains unclear precisely what this requires.
Following the crisis, the Basel Committee similarly sought to "reinforce
the collective oversight and risk governance responsibilities of the [bank] board,"
111. See Chen & Wu, supra note 104, at 2 (discussing the limited empirical
literature on board committees).
112. See id. at 12-19. Chen & Wu's sample includes "all Russell 3000 firms as well
as other peer firms and international firms predominantly from Canada, Bermuda and China,
with available committee membership data." Id. at 10. Financial firms are excluded, although
Chen and Wu note that they "also run our tests including these financial firms, and we get
similar results." Id. at 10 n. 14.
113. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 165(h), 124 Stat. 1376, 1429-30 (2010).
114. See 12 C.F.R. § 252.22(a) (2018). In May 2018 the EGRRCP Act raised the
threshold for mandatory risk committees from $10 billion to $50 billion. Economic Growth,
Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 115-174, § 401(a)(4),
132 Stat. 1296, 1357 (2018).
115. See 12 C.F.R. § 252.33(b). For rules applicable to foreign banks, see
§§ 252.132, 252.144, 252.155 (applying more lenient requirements to publicly traded foreign
banks with less than $50 billion in U.S. assets).
116. See Emily Flitter et al., How Wells Fargo and Federal Reserve Struck Deal to
Hold Bank's Board Accountable, N.Y. TiMEs (Feb. 4, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/business/wells-fargo-fed-board-directors-
penalties.html.
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issuing corporate governance guidelines in 2015.117 Emphasizing the board's
fiduciary obligations to the bank, the need to account for "the legitimate interests of
depositors, shareholders and other relevant stakeholders," and the board's
responsibility "for overseeing a strong risk governance framework," the Basel
Committee's guidelines require an express "risk appetite statement" and
establishment of "three lines of defence," including the "business line," a "risk
management function," and an "internal audit function." ' While not specifying a
bright-line threshold, the Basel Committee states that bank boards "should be
comprised of a sufficient number of independent directors" to permit "effective
oversight," including "individuals with a balance of skills, diversity and
expertise." '19 However, the guidelines are more specific regarding committee
composition. While the nomination committee should have "sufficient"
independence, the audit committee should "be made up entirely of independent or
non-executive board members," and the chair of each committee and the whole
board should likewise be independent-or at least a "senior independent board
member" should be appointed where the board chair holds an executive position.120
The board should likewise establish a risk committee responsible for "oversight of
the strategies for capital and liquidity management as well as for all relevant risks
of the bank," and this committee should be majority independent with an
independent chair.121 The guidelines strongly emphasize the need for "independent
risk management, compliance and audit functions," ' and the Basel Committee
clearly contemplates independent directors acting as the buffer between these
critical functions and senior management.123
While both the Dodd-Frank Act and the Basel reforms make passing nods
to the importance of risk-management expertise, neither expressly grapples with the
potential for heightened independence to come at the expense of such expertise. It
is generally understood that, in virtually any corporation, senior management will
have "informational advantages over outsiders who devote but a small portion of
their time and effort to the firm," 24 and this is not lost on directors themselves.
117. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, GUIDELINES: CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES FOR BANKS 4 (2015), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d328.pdf.
These guidelines build on an earlier effort from 2010. Id.
118. Id. at2, 9-11.
119. Id. at 13.
120. Id. at 14-16.
121. Id. at 17.
122. Id. at 20.
123. See id. at 25-26 (stating that the chief risk officer "should have the ability to
meet with the board or risk committee without executive directors being present").
124. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 103, at 87-88; see also Yvan Allaire, Board Members
Are Independent But Are They Legitimate and Credible? 7, 14 (Inst. for Governance of
Private and Pub. Orgs. Policy Paper No. 10, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=3198202 (describing the tradeoff
between independence and expertise); Jeff Zeyun Chen et al., IThen Are Outside Directors
More Effective Monitors? Evidence From Real Activities Manipulation, J. ACCT., AUDITING
& FIN. 1, 2-5 (Research Article, 2017),
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0148558X17692691 (same); Karmel, supra
note 103, at 811 (observing that independence rules skew director selection toward "former
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
Indeed, in one survey of directors from large corporations, 81% of respondents
reported that it has "become more difficult to recruit qualified directors," while just
73% reported that "their colleagues have detailed knowledge of the company's
industry," and just 61% reported that "their colleagues understand the company's
key technologies and business practices." '125 As one collaborator on the project put
it, "[w]e're constantly surprised ... when directors who have served on boards for
years confess that they don't really understand how their companies make money,"
but "perhaps we shouldn't be."1 2 6 Financial firms-far exceeding many other forms
of business in their organizational and technical complexity-are certainly no
exception. 117 In this light, it is alarming but hardly surprising that the "evolution of
aggregate levels of bank board experience" has been found to be "the mirror image
of that of board independence." 128
For a vivid example of these dynamics, one need look no further than the
largest U.S. bank holding company-JPMorgan Chase. 129 As of 2018, every
position on the 12-member board was held by an independent director, with one
exception-the Chairman and CEO, Jamie Dimon.131 One of the independent
directors-Linda Bammann, who chairs the Directors' Risk Policy Committee-is
actually a former Deputy Head of Risk Management at JPMorgan Chase and has
long-standing professional ties with Dimon (dating back to their days at Bank One,
where Dimon was Chairman and CEO and Bammann was Executive Vice President
and Chief Risk Management Officer until Bank One's merger with JPMorgan
government officials, other famous personalities, educators, and CEOs from other companies
... who are not sufficiently expert"); Sharpe, supra note 103, at 285-91 (describing
psychological and practical limitations of independent directors).
125. David A. Nadler, Building Better Boards, HARv. Bus. REv., May 2004, at 102,
107-08.
126. Id. at 110; see also Mirvis & Savitt, supra note 110, at 481 ("The typical board
of directors now includes a greater number of directors who lack detailed operational
knowledge about the firms they serve .... ).
127. See, e.g., Kristin N. Johnson, Macroprudential Regulation: A Sustainable
Approach to Regulating Financial Markets, 2013 U. ILL. L. REv. 881, 899-902; Macey &
O'Hara, supra note 9, at 90, 102-03; see also FOROOHAR, supra note 17, at 35 (observing that
the complexity of universal banking "creates tremendous risk," but that "complexity is also
where banks make their money").
128. Ferreira et al., supra note 24, at 8, 34-36.
129. See Holding Companies with Assets Greater Than $10 Billion, supra note 18
(reporting that JPMorgan Chase had total assets of over $2.5 trillion as of December 2017).
130. See JPMorgan Chase & Co., Proxy Statement
(Schedule 14A) 5 (Apr. 5, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000001961718000077/jpmc2018definitive
proxy.htm.
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Chase).1" 1 Apparently, Bammann counts as an independent director because she left
JPMorgan Chase in 2005.132
Beyond Dimon and Bammann, JPMorgan Chase's remaining directors
come to the boardroom with similarly impressive CVs, including individuals with
executive experience at major blue-chip companies and others with high-level
experience in accounting, real estate, and investment.133 However, these remaining
directors do not include career bankers,134 which naturally prompts a question-how
confident can we be that this nominally high level of independence is actually
delivering value net of costs? While these high-level executives and professionals
are no doubt highly engaged and sophisticated generally, the fact remains that there
is just one career banker in the room-the Chairman and CEO, who ironically looms
all that much larger amidst this sea of independence, precisely because there is no
one else at the table approximating his depth of industry experience. 13 5 There appear
131. See id.; Linda B. Bammann, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.,
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/About-JPMC/ab-board-bio-lindabbammann.htm
(last visited June 15, 2018); Jamie Dimon, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.,
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/About-JPMC/ab-board-bio-jamesdimon.htm
(last visited June 15, 2018).
132. See JPMorgan Chase & Co., supra note 130, at 5 n.3; New York Stock
Exchange Listed Company Manual § 303A.02(b)(i) (providing that a director is not
considered independent if he or she "is, or has been within the last three years, an employee
of the listed company").
133. See JPMorgan Chase & Co., supra note 130, at 5. Lee Raymond, the retired
Chairman and CEO of Exxon Mobil Corporation, serves as the "Lead Independent Director."
Id.
134. This is not unusual among large financial firms. See, e.g., ROBERT POZEN, Too
BIG TO SAVE? HOW To Fix THE U.S. FINANCIAL SYSTEM 283-85 (2010).
135. Cf Johnson, supra note 127, at 898 (observing that reliance on executives for
information potentially "undermines independent directors' ability to evaluate information
'independently'); Karmel, supra note 103, at 790 (arguing that "dependence on insiders may
give a CEO more power than was the case when a board included insiders"); Kastiel & Nili,
supra note 105, at 27-29 (observing that "independent directors may feel uncomfortable
challenging managerial decisions that they do not understand"); Mirvis & Savitt, supra note
110, at 486 (observing that "independent directors are more likely to rely for information and
insight on the very management they are meant to be governing"); Rodrigues, supra note 105,
at 1069 (observing that increased director independence "paradoxically reduces its autonomy
by reducing the number of its information channels and making the remaining few sources
all the more important"); Sharpe, supra note 103, at 307 ("The CEO is primarily in charge of
disseminating information to the board, which results in asymmetrical information skewed
towards the CEO's viewpoint."). Concerns about such dynamics have prompted wide-ranging
reform proposals, from a "Board Suite" providing information independent of management,
Kastiel & Nili, supra note 105, at 50-55, to literal curtailment of the board's role to
monitoring of conflict scenarios, Rodrigues, supra note 105, at 1067-81.
While JPMorgan Chase's board does include the firm's own retired Deputy
Head of Risk Management, in light of her long-standing ties to the Chairman and CEO one
naturally wonders to what degree she provides a truly independent viewpoint. As Leo Strine
(then-Vice Chancellor of the Delaware Chancery Court) explained in assessing the relevance
of social ties to the independence inquiry in the special litigation committee context,
regardless of one's subjective good faith and commitment to professional responsibility, it
has to be recognized that
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to be no other viewpoints in the room from people with appreciable experience in
banking, who we could reasonably expect to fully comprehend the risks emanating
from various corners of JPMorgan Chase's far-flung and hyper-complex global
operations, let alone to impose themselves as stalwart brakes against excessive risk-
taking.
B. Independent Directors, Risk-Taking, and Financial Expertise
There is an irony in the push for board-level independence to be grounded
(at least in the Basel Committee's case) in stakeholder-oriented corporate
governance theory136 because, as noted above, heightened board independence has
typically been rationalized as a means of advancing shareholder interests and has
been associated with bad outcomes following the onset of the crisis."' However,
empirical studies in the broader corporate governance context more generally call
into question the wisdom of mandating high levels of director independence in
industries characterized by high levels of complexity. While this literature for a time
suggested that director independence had little or no performance impact,138 more
nuanced, recent studies have found that the impacts of independence may depend
largely on the cost of information acquisition in a given company. One study, for
example, found that "adding outside directors to the board does not help or hurt
performance on average, consistent with the previous literature," but that "outsiders
significantly improve performance when their information cost is low, and hurt
•.. corporate directors are generally the sort of people deeply enmeshed
in social institutions. Such institutions have norms, expectations that...
influence and channel the behavior of those who participate in their
operation. Some things are "just not done," or only at a cost .... In being
appropriately sensitive to this factor, our law also cannot assume -absent
some proof of the point- that corporate directors are, as a general matter,
persons of unusual social bravery, who operate heedless to the inhibitions
that social norms generate for ordinary folk.
Inre Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 938 (Del. Ch. 2003).
136. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 117, at 3 ("The
primary objective of corporate governance should be safeguarding stakeholders' interest in
conformity with public interest on a sustainable basis. Among stakeholders, particularly with
respect to retail banks, shareholders' interest would be secondary to depositors' interest.");
Ferrarini, supra note 7, at 19-20.
137. See, e.g., Bruner, supra note 8, at 552-53 (discussing the literature); Duchin
et al., supra note 103, at 195 (discussing "the idea that outside directors are important
custodians of shareholder interests"); Fernandes et al., supra note 7, (manuscript at 10-11)
(discussing the literature). For cross-country comparisons of one-tier and two-tier board
structures, see F. Arnaboldi & B. Casu, Corporate Governance in European Banking 8-9 (Jan.
18, 2011) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1763134; Marina Brogi, Two-Tier
Boards for the Governance of Banks 14 (June 2009) (unpublished manuscript),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228254090; Ferreira et al., supra note 24, at 7, 32
("Bank board independence is significantly higher in countries with mandatory one-tiered
board structures.").
138. See, e.g., Adams & Mehran, supra note 28, at 248, 258; Brogi, supra note 137,
at 6-7; Duchin et al., supra note 103, at 195-96; Fernandes et al., supra note 7, (manuscript
at 18-21).
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performance when their information cost is high.""1 3 The authors suggest, intuitively
enough, that the "finding of consistent negative effects tends to reinforce the
message that outsiders are less effective when it is difficult for them to understand
the firm's business," and conclude that "the one-size-fits-all approach of the new
board regulations may not be ideal."14
Similarly, a study of nonfinancial S&P 500 companies141 found evidence
indicating that the presence of independent directors with relevant expertise on the
audit committee can reduce the "ex ante probability of earnings manipulation," but
"only in the subsample of firms with higher information asymmetry;" that is, in
situations where "board monitoring would be difficult without industry
expertise. '  The authors further found that the involvement of independent
directors is substantially beneficial "only in the subsamples of firms with higher
information asymmetry, firms from more homogenous industries, firms whose
CEOs have more ex ante equity incentives to manipulate earnings, and firms at a
higher risk of violating [Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)]. '"1
Likewise, they found substantial beneficial effects when the independent directors'
expertise "is acquired more recently, from public firms, at the executive level, and
through an accounting-related position."1 44 These findings, the authors conclude,
underscore "the importance of differentiating among firms, industries, and the
nature of the industry experience." 145
While the foregoing evidence relates to nonfinancial firms, there is reason
to believe that financial firms may themselves have been negatively impacted by the
foregoing dynamics; that is, by high degrees of board independence without
requisite expertise in a high information-cost environment. As Jonathan Macey and
Maureen O'Hara observe, "risk management of a complex financial institution is
not something easily grasped by a typical corporate director; it instead requires
specialized expertise"-a reality prompting them to argue that "risk management
committees should be composed only of individuals who can demonstrate expertise
139. Duchin et al., supra note 103, at 196, 204. For a discussion of Duchin et al.'s
methodology, see Frederick Tung, The Puzzle of Independent Directors: New Learning, 91
B.U. L. REv. 1175, 1186-89 (2011) (critiquing their use of analyst error as a measure of
information cost, as independent directors "have much greater access to information than
analysts").
140. Duchin et al., supra note 103, at 209, 212; see also BAINBRIDGE, supra note
103, at 101-02; Allaire, supra note 124, at 15, 26-29.
141. Cong Wang et al., Industry Expertise of Independent Directors and Board
Monitoring, 50 J. FIN. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 929, 936-37 (2015).
142. Id. at 942-45. The authors code an independent director "as having industry
expertise ... if he or she has previously held a director or executive position at another firm
in the same 2-digit [Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)] industry as the firm on whose
board he or she sits." Id. at 936.
143. Id. at 946.
144. Id. at 950.
145. Id. at 950; see also Chen et al., supra note 124, at 3, 11 (finding, in a study of
nonfinancial and nonutility firms, that "more independent boards are more effective monitors
of real earnings management when it is less costly for them to become informed about
managerial behavior").
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in evaluating and monitoring the risk control systems of a bank. 14 The need for
such a step-up in board-level expertise is indeed acute, as Robert Pozen observes in
his diagnosis of the financial system's meltdown: "I have personal experience in
examining closely the board members of two large banks. I was surprised to find
how few independent directors had been executives at financial institutions. This
appears to be typical in the large U.S. banks." '147
Given these apparent shortcomings, the first and most obvious possibility
would be to simply stop doing this-stop defaulting to more and more board
independence as the go-to solution for every governance-related problem under the
sun and perhaps even carve back at some of the existing requirements.148 However,
there seems to be little realistic prospect of this happening. As the empirical work
described above suggests, there do appear to be certain low-information-cost
contexts where it is relatively easier for independent directors to learn about the
business, and where the objectivity benefits of independent directors do seem to
improve performance.149 Accordingly, we might consider carving back at such
requirements solely in high-information-cost industries, where expertise is at a real
premium, yet even here the political challenges are likely insurmountable.
Regardless of context, there are powerful political forces that consistently push in
this direction in the wake of crises. Requiring more independent directors offers
policymakers an easy fix, and a comprehensible reform narrative that makes it
appear to the public as if they have actually solved a problem-and it is critical to
recognize that managers themselves may be amenable to this if they consider it a
less intrusive alternative to substantive regulation. 50 So even if backing away from
146. Macey & O'Hara, supra note 9, at 103; see also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 103,
at 103-04; POZEN, supra note 134, at 283-85; Fernandes et al., supra note 7, (manuscript at
18-20, 24-26); Johnson, supra note 127, at 899-902; Stulz, supra note 7, at 49-51. While
the Dodd-Frank Act requires just one "risk management expert," the Fed's final rule release
indicates that "the Board would expect all risk committee members generally to have an
understanding of risk management principles and practices relevant to the company," and that
"the risk committee of a company that poses more systemic risk should have more risk
committee members with commensurately greater understandings of risk management
principles and practices." Enhanced Prudential Standards for Bank Holding Companies and
Foreign Banking Organizations, 79 Fed. Reg. 17240, 17249 (Mar. 27, 2014) (final rule
adopted by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to implement Dodd-Frank
Act § 165).
147. POZEN, supra note 134, at 283; see also Allaire, supra note 124, at 21-22
(observing that Lehman Brothers' board largely consisted of "ex-CEOs of large corporations"
whose experience "had little relevance for the business of Lehman," and concluding that "a
board made up of independent members with impressive biographies is not ipso facto
credible").
148. Cf Mirvis & Savitt, supra note 110, at 484 (characterizing the call for greater
director independence following the Enron and WorldCom meltdowns as "reflex unburdened
by logic"); Tung, supra note 139, at 1176 ("In our hopes and dreams ... the independent
director offers something of a magic bullet for corporate governance.").
149. See supra notes 138-146 and accompanying text.
150. Cf JOHN W. CIOFFI, PUBLIC LAW AND PRIVATE POWER: CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE REFORM IN THE AGE OF FINANCE CAPITALISM 214 (2010) (observing that "the
financial sector fiercely resisted broader financial system reforms" in the wake of the crisis,
and that "[m]uted opposition to the progress of corporate governance reforms thus may have
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these requirements would make sense-at least in high-information-cost
industries-such a move remains unlikely.
So what else can be done? An alternative might be to add some nuance to
independence requirements themselves. If we cannot realistically achieve the
requisite level of expertise by relaxing board-independence requirements, then
perhaps we might do so by changing the composition of the independent component
of the board. As a threshold matter, note that even if we hold constant the majority-
independence listing requirement,151 a balance of objectivity and expertise should
be attainable without having to require that all independent directors be industry
experts. For example, a board with a bare majority of independent directors, a bare
majority of whom have industry experience, should sum up (together with the
insiders) to a solid majority with relevant expertise.152
There is a strong case to be made that board-level independence rules
across the universe of public companies-financial and nonfinancial alike-ought
to require more generally that (at least some of the) independent directors have
experience in (at least broadly) related industries. As a structural matter, such a
requirement should prove straightforward and realistic, given availability of
classification systems already widely used in a variety of public and private
contexts.153 For example, in 1997 the North American Industry Classification
System (NAICS)-a U.S., Canadian, and Mexican collaborative effort-was
adopted to replace Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, which had been
the U.S. standard since the 1930s.154 NAICS "is constructed within a single
conceptual framework;" the core principle being that "[e]conomic units that have
similar production processes are classified in the same industry, and the lines drawn
between industries demarcate, to the extent practicable, differences in production
processes." '155 Services received particular attention in development of the NAICS,
reflected a political and legal bet by financial sector managers that enhanced shareholder
powers within corporate governance would likely prove less constraining and threatening
than other items on the postcrisis reform agenda").
151. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
152. For example, assume a board of 12 directors. If a majority of 7 were
independent, and a majority of 4 of those independent directors had industry expertise, then
(together with the 5 insiders) a solid majority of 9 directors would possess relevant expertise.
153. For one such approach to measuring industry proximity, applied in an
empirical study of independent directors' expertise, see Wang et al., supra note 141, at 936;
see also Allaire, supra note 124, at 9, 30 (advocating that directors be recruited from
"industries with characteristics that closely [track] those of in the industry in which the target
company operates").
154. See ExEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NORTH AMERICAN INDUSTRY
CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 3, 13 (2017),
https://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/2017NAICS/2017NAICSManual.pdf.
155. Id. at 3. Other jurisdictions and international organizations have developed
similar classification systems for similar applications. See, e.g., Glossary: Statistical
Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community (NACE), EUROSTAT,
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Glossary: Statistical classification of economic activities in the Eur
opean Community_(NACE) (last visited Dec. 20, 2017); UK Standard Industrial
Classification of Economic Activities, OFF. FOR NAT'L STAT.,
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which divides economic activity into 20 sectors including 1,057 industries (as of
2017). 156 The system employs "a six-digit coding system to identify particular
industries and their placement," and the "Finance and Insurance" sector consists of
five subsectors including numerous distinct industry groups and industries.15 7 While
concerns regarding categorization of complex multi-service firms are inevitable,
1 5 8
the system's hierarchical nature15 9 lends itself to measuring industry proximity
flexibly, with greater specificity or generality as the case may be. Additional
flexibility would arise from the inherent scalability of such a requirement-e.g.,
applying to some or all independent directors on a given board. 160 Both of these
forms of flexibility render such an approach compatible with reform proposals
emphasizing institutional support for independent directors coming to the firm from
different professional backgrounds. 161
In any event, the need for relevant experience would seem to be particularly
acute in the context of financial firms, yet the potential loss of expertise that often
accompanies independence requirements has received little attention, suggesting
that we can expect problems of this sort to persist.162 Much like our reliance on
equity capital providers to serve as a buffer against shocks and a means of limiting
https://www.ons.gov.uk/methodology/classificationsandstandards/ukstandardindustrialclassi
ficationofeconomicactivities (last visited Dec. 20, 2017); International Standard Industrial
Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC), U.N. INDUS. DEV. ORG.,
https://stat.unido.org/content/learning-center/intemational-standard-industrial-classification-
of-all-economic-activities-%2528isic%/o2529 (last visited Dec. 20, 2017).
156. See ExEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 154, at 3, 14.
157. Id. at 18, 429-47.
158. See, e.g., Jennifer Boettcher, Challenges and Opportunities Presented by
NAICS, 5 J. Bus. & FIN. LIBRARIANSHIP 3, 6-7 (1999). For the Finance and Insurance sector,
the approach to "varied activities taking place within existing financial institutions" is to "split
these institutions into components performing specialized services," which are treated as "the
equivalents for finance and insurance of the establishments defined for other industries."
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 154, at 429.
159. "The first two digits of the [NAICS] code designate the sector, the third digit
designates the subsector, the fourth digit designates the industry group, the fifth digit
designates the NAICS industry, and the sixth digit designates the national industry." ExEc.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 154, at 18.
160. Recall that the Dodd-Frank Act already requires certain publicly traded bank
holding companies and Fed-supervised, nonbank financial firms to have a risk committee that
includes "at least 1 risk management expert having experience in identifying, assessing, and
managing risk exposures of large, complex firms." See supra note 113 and accompanying
text. The problem is that this requirement is both minimal and imprecise.
161. Cf Allaire, supra note 124, at 8 (advocating "a customized development
program" for a new director who "lacks the requisite experience/knowledge"); Kastiel & Nili,
supra note 105, at 50-55 (advocating a "Board Suite" to give independent directors
"independent access to company-specific data, institutional knowledge, as well as better
resources to analyze the information that is collected by them"). Combining approaches in
this manner might help maintain a larger pool of potential directors, alleviating concerns
arising from director "busyness." Cf generally Kress, supra note 7 (arguing that excessively
busy financial firm directors cannot effectively monitor risk exposure, and that those
occupying certain critical positions accordingly should have only limited additional
commitments).
162. See supra notes 124-128 and accompanying text.
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leverage, the wisdom of reliance on independent directors to serve as a risk-
management buffer turns principally on who the people performing this role actually
are. Until we develop a clearer sense of who director-independence rules tend to
place in financial firm boardrooms and take steps to ensure sufficient expertise, we
should remain skeptical that greater independence in this context will inherently
make us better off.
CONCLUSIONS
Resorting to risk-preferring shareholders as a means of mitigating risk-
taking across the financial system, and resorting to inexpert, independent directors
as a means of improving risk management in financial firms, reflect an overly
cramped contemporary conception of corporate governance. Historically, corporate
governance has been considerably more fluid and flexible than it is today, permitting
managers greater latitude across the universe of public companies to mitigate the
extreme pathologies associated with the single-minded pursuit of profit
maximization,163 while at the same time carving out exceptional areas-notably,
financial firms-where greater social and economic risks prompted substantial
deviations from traditional governance paradigms.164 However, over time strong-
form emphasis on shareholder interests has increasingly dominated corporate
governance and related discourses among policymakers, practitioners, financial
market participants, and academics alike,165 and financial firms themselves have
come to be viewed through the lens of that increasingly shareholder-centric public-
company paradigm.166 These developments have prompted a series of post-crisis
reforms to financial firms' capital structure and corporate governance that may do
more harm than good from a risk perspective.167
There is (or should be) room to debate the merits of various ways forward.
It is increasingly understood that shareholder wealth maximization and risk
management stand in fundamental tension and that regulatory supervision and
corporate governance can function as complementary mechanisms for managing
that tension. 168 How such balances ought to be struck remains hotly contested,169 but
it is important to acknowledge that the emphasis placed on corporate governance
implies imperfect confidence in the potential adequacy of external supervision to
contain risk-taking.170 This places a real premium on developing a clear-eyed
163. See generally Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of
Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L. REv. 1385 (2008). For a comparative study of these dynamics in
common-law countries, see BRUNER, supra note 5.
164. See generally Bruner, supra note 8.
165. For a historical discussion, see generally David Millon, Radical Shareholder
Primacy, 10U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 1013 (2013).
166. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
167. See supra Parts I-II.
168. See, e.g., Ferrarini, supra note 7, at 1, 14.
169. See, e.g., id. at 16-22 (arguing that prioritizing other stakeholders ought to be
confined to external regulation, freeing managers to focus on shareholders).
170. Cf Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 24, at 253, 280-82 (observing that
"prudential regulation is necessarily imperfect" and arguing that "[r]egulating bankers' pay
could nicely supplement and reinforce the traditional, direct regulation of banks' activities");
Omarova, supra note 6, at 1044-45 ("As market 'outsiders,' financial regulators perennially
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understanding of risk incentives and interests among various internal corporate
constituencies.
While efforts to reorient financial firm boards (including their independent
directors) toward greater stability-orientation obviously face substantial obstacles
within a broader corporate governance system strongly favoring risk-preferring
shareholders,171 this recognition only highlights the pressing need to assess, and
address, those mechanisms of financial firm governance that incentivize excess risk-
taking in the first place. The fact is that we have long understood the ultimate
wellspring of financial firm risk-taking and how to alter those incentives-most
notably through liability rules that directly alter the risk calculus for shareholders
and boards alike. 172 Further ensuring that independent directors actually understand
the peculiarities and complexities of the firms that they are charged to govern-
including their risk exposures and risk-management strategies-will likewise prove
essential. 173
As a threshold matter, such steps cannot be taken without fully
acknowledging the degree to which strong-form shareholder-centrism contributed
to the financial crisis by incentivizing highly undesirable forms and degrees of risk-
taking. Short of such a fundamental reckoning, smart money should expect
prevailing governance models to generate further crises.
lag behind private market participants in their ability to access and process vital market
information, and their ability to act is inherently limited by various jurisdictional
constraints.").
171. See Ferrarini, supra note 7, at 16-22; Omarova, supra note 6, at 1036-40,
1050.
172. See Bruner, supra note 8; Macey & O'Hara, supra note 9, at 98-101.
173. See Macey & O'Hara, supra note 9, at 102-03; see also supra Part II; cf
Hockett, supra note 6, at 1074, 1095 (arguing that "private law fiduciary duty offers little, if
any, solution to recursive collective action problems" of the sort arising in the financial
system, yet acknowledging that "systemic financial dysfunction" may be amenable to such a
response if we "alter the decision calculi of the beneficiaries of fiduciary duty ... such as
then changes the calculi of fiduciaries themselves").
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